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Abstract: This paper scrutinizes the authentication and key agreement protocol adopted by the Universal Mobile
Telecommunication System to meet the standards of a fourth-generation network. Lately, communication of multimedia
(CoM) has drawn the attention of researchers for the future of secure wireless mobile communication. However, the CoM
has not had any defensive mechanism to fulfil the specifications of 3GPP and reduce the computation and communication
overheads and susceptible attacks like redirection, man-in-the-middle, and denial of service attacks. In addition, this
paper has thoroughly investigated some existing protocols from the literature for the identification of new challenges
in server-client authentication. To probe the challenges of the existing schemes realistically, the multimedia client and
multimedia server components (proxy, interrogating, serving, and home subscriber server) were physically deployed on the
Linux platform to examine the specifications of 3GPP, vulnerable attacks, computation, and communication overheads.
We observed that the examined existing schemes are not able to fulfill the above criteria. We thus propose addition of
the mutual authenticated session key (MASK) to the physical environment of the multimedia server-client. To satisfy
the 3GPP specifications, the protocol of MASK oﬀers mutual authenticity to the multimedia server-client. Moreover, the
feature of mutual authenticity reduces the computation and communication overheads of the multimedia server-client.
Since the session keys are jointly shared between the multimedia server and client, the protocol of MASK can additionally
provide privacy preservation and forward secrecy.
Key words: Universal Mobile Telecommunication System, communication of multimedia, secure wireless mobile communication, 3GPP, authentication and key agreement, mutual authenticated session key, multimedia server-client

1. Introduction
The Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS) standardized the fastest third-generation (3G)-based
systems for the technology of mobile communication. For the fourth-generation (4G) network, it took up the
authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol, which was designed to ensure the secure provisional services
of multimedia like voice, video, and instant messaging over the Internet [1–4]. However, it has not had any
counteracting mechanisms for packet sniﬀers and flooding attackers. Thus, the packet contents of multimedia
cannot be secured over the Internet. In the first-generation (1G) network, the challenging issues of security
were not as remarked as they should have been and thus, with the use of low-cost technology, anomalies can
overhear the users’ traﬃc to exploit services. To resolve the challenging issues of 1G, the second-generation
(2G) network implemented the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM).
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Unfortunately, the authentication of the GSM was unidirectional and thus failed to authenticate the
serving networks. The lack of mutual authenticity of the 2G network has hence brought the issue of false
base-station attacks. To make the authentication bidirectional, the protocol of 3GPP AKA has emerged as
GSM AKA for significant goals such as mutual authentication, agreement on an integrity key, and assurance
on the cipher and integrity keys. The purpose of AKA protocol is to use a key generation mechanism-based
challenge-response to ensure whether security properties are satisfied or not.
The objective of the GSM AKA was to generate the authentication vector to achieve mutual authentication over the users and serving networks. Then the generated authentication vectors of the users and serving
networks are checked for identity matching. If the matching is successful, then the users get the connection
through the serving network to access the services of GSM. Otherwise, the users and serving networks need
resynchronization to adjust the authentication vector in the home network. 3GPP collaborates with the telecommunication group to introduce a 3G mobile system. To date, the AKA security mechanism of 3GPP has had
many serious flaws over public networks. To be flawless, the traditional cryptosystem has been adapted as a
public key cryptosystem. Since mobile devices have limited power and computational capability, they do not
support the public key cryptosystem.
To determine the solution, an elliptic-curve cryptography (E-CC) technique is used for merits such
as smaller key size and faster key computation. As a result, mobile devices are inclined to be E-CC-based
cryptosystems rather than traditional cryptosystems. E-CC needs to keep the certificate of the public users
and thus increases the storage capacity of the public key infrastructure like the other public key cryptosystems.
To address the issue of storage capacity, Shamir [5] proposed an identity-based public key cryptosystem to
reduce the barrier of certification management, although that system was not practically oriented. To make
the security system practical, Boneh and Franklin [6] proposed an identity-based encryption model using Weil
pairing that was adopted using E-CC in 2001.
Sui et al. [7] proposed an improved version of the AKA protocol in 2005 for wireless communication
devices, although that scheme failed to withstand attacks of oﬄine password guessing. Determining the solution
for oﬄine password-guessing attacks, Liao et al. [8] enhanced the AKA protocol of Sui et al. in 2009. Lu et al.
[9] remarked that the enhanced scheme of Liao et al. [8] could not resist parallel guessing attacks. Moreover,
Chang et al. [10] proposed a newer version of the AKA protocol to counteract parallel guessing attacks, but
that version failed to oﬀer mutual authenticity to users. Kılınç et al. [11] introduced the key-ephemeral strategy
for the purpose of attack resiliencies, like replay, key-impersonation, known-key, ephemeral-key, and forwardsecrecy, although the authors failed to provide mutual authenticity and thus did not oﬀer a counteracting
strategy reliably to server-client systems. Zhang et al. [12] presented a secure authentication scheme for serverclient authentication, but their scheme failed to oﬀer services like key-impersonation, server-spoofing, and denial
of service (DoS). Thus, we decide to propose a mutual authenticated session key (MASK) that mutually shares
the authentication key to enhance the security for multimedia server-client systems. In addition, we analyze the
proposed protocol of MASK and compare it with the existing protocols such as those of Lu et al. [9], Chang et
al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al. [12] in the multimedia server-client environment.
Researchers usually verify mutual authenticity with the proposal of an authentication scheme. We decided
to deploy a real server (www.openim-score.org/) a real client (www.uctimsclient.-berlios.de/) to examine the
AKA schemes like MASK and those of Lu et al. [9], Chang et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al.
[12]. Moreover, we examine the schemes in a traﬃc analyzer tool (www.ntop.org/) to analyze metrics like
call setup time, flooding SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) attack detection rate, and signal congestion rate.
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Importantly, the real-time multimedia server and client systems are integrated with authenticated related key
security mechanisms that were defined as the important specification of 3GPP in [13]. Section 3 will discuss
the detailed review of AKA schemes, such as those of Lu et al. [9], Chang et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and
Zhang et al. [12].
1.1. Research contributions
The research contributions are as follows:
1. The proposed protocol of MASK meets all the security requirements that are defined in the 3GPP security
mechanisms.
2. Importantly, the MASK mechanism inherits the methodical idea of a symmetric key cryptosystem to
expand the sharing key preservation in the 4G networks.
3. The MASK mechanism proficiently shares the session key to curtail the computational overhead of the
multimedia server-client.
4. The techniques of password predetermination are used to infer the traﬃc to improve network performance.
5. The strategy of twofold verification rather than hash verification is used to curtail the message delivery
cost.
6. MASK is able to withstand attacks like SIP flooding and examination of results is revealed in Section 5.
7. To verify the secured authentication and security strength, the ntop traﬃc analyzer (www.ntop.org/) is
used.
8. The MASK mechanism enriches the communication eﬃciency of the multimedia server-client.
9. A multimedia server, namely OpenIMSCore (www.openimscore.org/), is deployed on three diﬀerent Linux
platforms to probe the AKA schemes.
10. A multimedia client such as UCTIMS (www.uctimsclient.berlios.de/) is deployed in three diﬀerent operating systems (Linux Mint, Ubuntu, CentOS) to probe the voice call sessions.
11. The AKA schemes of Lu et al. [9], Chang et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al. [12] and MASK
are integrated with the multimedia server-client to analyze the aforesaid metrics.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related work on the AKA protocol.
Section 3 reviews the AKA schemes of Lu et al., Chang et al., Kılınç et al., and Zhang et al. Section 4 proposes
the MASK for the multimedia server-client. Section 5 provides the results and discussion. Section 6 concludes
the research work.
2. Related work
The key agreement (KA) protocol is usually called a primitive version of cryptography. It is employed to construct a secure session key between the server and client. However, the KA protocol without user authentication
is not secure against the anomaly-in-the-middle attack. Thus, researchers and technical experts have proposed
several authentication mechanisms [9–14] for the purpose of secure user authentication. The AKA protocol is
used to oﬀer mutual authentication to the server-client system. The server-client system shares the session key
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when it is generated by the server component. To examine the server component, this paper has deployed a
physical multimedia server-client for the consideration of 3GPP features, signal congestion, and computational
overhead. Since cryptographic operation is necessitated and expensive, the communication system, namely the
server-client, should not have considered the computational limitation [15–18].
The AKA protocol is mainly focused on the traditional public key cryptosystem to reduce the computation
of low-power devices. It has lately been proposed for the reduction of computational overhead. Until now,
none of the AKA protocols have physically been examined for evaluation results and it has moreover left the
following examinations, namely the fulfillment of 3GPP features and signal congestion, undone. Jakobsson and
Pointcheval [19] proposed two diﬀerent AKA mechanisms to reduce the computation of mobile devices. Later,
Wong and Chan [20] proposed a mutual authentication mechanism to influential servers and low-computing
devices. The protocol of Wong and Chan oﬀers mutual authentication to fulfill the security properties of the
server-client environment, but it showed its low computation for the client. We thus decided to examine the
computation cost of the multimedia server-client environment.
To examine the forward secrecy (perfect), Smart [21] proposed an identity-based authentication mechanism using the Weil pairing system. Subsequently, Shim [22] revealed that the mechanism of Smart does
not provide perfect forward secrecy. In addition, Shim exhibited an identity-based authentication mechanism
with fewer Weil pairing operations. Later on, several identity-based authentication mechanisms [23–42] were
proposed to reduce the computational cost of mobile devices, although the authentication systems are not yet
fully suited [11–28,37–42] for low-power computational devices. Thus, the protocol of MASK is proposed to
fulfill the current demand of multimedia server-client systems. We also investigate the testing parameters of
computation overhead, 3GPP feature, call setup time, SIP flooding attack detection rate, and signal congestion
using a physical multimedia server-client system.
Li and Hwang [29] proposed an authentication scheme to use a random nonce instead of a synchronization
clock and it was proven to be eﬃcient in terms of less computation cost. Later on, Li et al. [30] and Das [31]
demonstrated that the scheme of Li and Hwang failed to provide proper mutual authentication and resist manin-the-middle attacks. Yoon and Yoo [32] proposed a robust client-server authentication scheme to oﬀer strong
user authentication, although Kim et al. [33] pointed out that the scheme of Yoon and Yoo was not resilient
to password (oﬄine) guessing attacks. Recently, Li et al. [34] found some security weaknesses of Das [31]
and Lee et al. [35], such as session-key agreement and key-impersonation attacks using biometric-based user
authentication schemes. As a consequence, none of the existing authentication schemes [9–12,28–42] fulfill the
security properties of the AKA protocol and resist most of the potential attacks, such as password guessing,
key impersonation, and so on, in the multimedia client-server environment. Most recently, Deebak et al. [36]
presented a secure key AKA protocol scheme to satisfy the promising feature of the 3GPP AKA protocol using
IP multimedia server-client systems. However, the scheme of Deebak et al. [36] failed to satisfy key factors such
as active-attack on corrupted network, server-spoofing attack, privacy, and reduction of message delivering cost.
3. Review of AKA schemes
To ease the reading, significant notations are provided in Table 1. The AKA schemes of Lu et al. [9], Chang
et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al. [12] were studied and their flow methodologies are descriptively
explained as follows.
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Table 1. Notations.

Dc , Ds1 Ds2 Rc αx, yra rb
MClient , MServer
N
P
D
T
H, Hf
s
Ps
H1 (), H2 ()
IDM Client
CSAuth
PCS
Ski
Sk CS
P vtu1
P ubu1
Uid
SS key
Sid
f(.)
f ∗ (.)
U
UN ame
RE alm
δ
ks
⊕
Pwd

Random integers
Communication entities
Secure large prime number
Large prime order N
Uniform distribution dictionary size |D|
Password predetermination
One-way secure hash functions
Private key of the server
Public key of the server
Map-to-point function
Identity of multimedia clients
Client server authentication key
Prime number of client-server
Generation of ithsession key
Shared session key of client-server
Private key of U ser1
Public key of U ser1
Identity of U ser1
Shared session key
Server identity
One-way hash function
Another hash function used for session Key
User (multimedia)
User name
Server realm (domain name)
Key verifier
Secret key
Exclusive operator
User’s password

3.1. AKA Scheme of Lu et al [9]
Lu et al. [9] proposed an enhanced version of the AKA protocol, namely ECAKA (elliptic curve authenticated
key agreement). The aim of this protocol was to prevent oﬄine guessing attacks. The execution flows of ECAKA
are represented in Table 2 and are as follows.
Flow1: First, MClient selects the random number DC ∈ [1, N − 1] and does the computation of
QC1 = (DC + T ) .P, QC2 = DC2 .P . Then MClient sends QC1 , QC2 to Server MServer .
Flow2: Second, MServer selects the two random numbers DS1 , DS2 ∈ [1, N − 1] and does the computations of Y = QC − TP = DCP , QS1 = DS1 .P + DS2 .Y and QS2 = DS1 .Y + DS2 .QS2 . Then MServer
′

sends hServer = h((Alice ||Server|| QC1 ||QS1 || QS2 ) , QS2 ) to MClient , and ′ h represents a one-way secure
hash function and ||} represents the symbol of concatenation.
Flow3: Third, MClient does the computation of EX = DC .QS1 = DS1 .DC .P + DS2 .DC2 .P to
validate whether the equality of hash function h (Alice ||Server|| QC1 ||QS1 || EX ) = hServer 1rver| eterminomputationors are failed to oﬀer ng against the attacks, like Spoofing attack of stolen-verifier adheres or not. If
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the hash function adheres then MClient does the computation of h (Server ||Alice|| QS1 ||QC1 || EX ) = hAlice .
Then MClient sends it to MServer with the session key KAlice = EX .
Table 2. AKA scheme of Lu et al.

Flow4: Fourth, MServer does the computation of hash function h (Server ||Alice|| QS1 ||QC1 || QS2 ) =
hAlice if it adheres and then it sets the session key as KServer = QS2 .
3.2. AKA scheme of Chang et al [10]
Chang et al. [10] proposed an extension of the authentication scheme of Lu et al., namely EC-PAKA (elliptic
curve-based password authenticated key agreement). The aim of this protocol was to prevent password guessing
attacks, but it failed to provide mutual authentication for the users. The execution flows of EC-PAKA are
represented in Table 3 and are as follows.
Table 3. AKA scheme of Chang et al.

3163

DEEBAK et al./Turk J Elec Eng & Comp Sci

Flow1: First, MClient selects the random number DC ∈ [1, N − 1] and does the computation of
QC1 = (DC + T ) .P, QC2 = DC2 .P . Then MClient sends QC1 , QC2 } to MServer .
Flow2: Second, MServer selects the two random numbers DS1 , DS2 ∈ [1, N − 1] and does the computations of Y = QC − TP = DC .P, QS2 = DS1 .Y + DS2 .QS2 and hServer = h(Alice ||Server|| QC1 ||QS1 || Y ).
Eventually,MServer sends the message transmission as hServer , QS1 to MClient .
Flow3: On receiving the message transmission of hServer , QS1 , MClient validates whether the equality
?

adheres or not. h (Alice ||Server|| QC1 ||QS1 || Y ) ⇐⇒ hServer .
If it adheres, then MClient does the computation of h (Server ∥ Alice ∥ Qs1 ∥ Qc1 ∥ Dc .P ) = hAlice and
then MClient sends it to MServer to compute the session key, EX = DC .QS1 = DS1 .DC .P + DS2 .DC2 .P and
KAlice = EX .
Flow4: On receiving the transmission message of hAlice , MServer validates whether the equality adheres
or not. If it adheres, then MServer computes the session key,
h (Server ||Alice|| QS1 ||QC1 || Y ) = hAlice and KServer = QS2.
3.3. AKA Scheme of Kılınç et al [11]
The protocol of Kılınç et al. [11] introduced a strategy of decisional bilinear Diﬃe–Hellman (DB-DH) and the
objective of the strategy is to counteract attacks like replay, key-impersonation, known-key, ephemeral-key, and
forward secrecy. Besides, the adversary cannot deduce the session key of the communication parties, since the
session key relies on the technical strategy of ephemeral keys, namely x and y. The authentication flows of
Kılınç et al. are represented in Table 4 and are as follows:
Table 4. AKA scheme of Kılınç et al.

Flow1: MClient → MServer : Request{Uid , T1 , T2 }
Here, a user generates a random integer x and then computes T1 = x.P + x.P vtu1 and T2 = x.P ubu1
from the U ser1 public and private keys. Eventually, MClient sends a Request message Uid , T1 , T2 to MServer
with the user identifier of Uid .
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Flow2: MServer → MClient : Challenge{Uid , T2 , f (k, Sid )}
′

Upon receiving the Request{Uid , T1 , T2 message from MClient , MServer computes x .P = T1 −P vtkey .T2
(
)
′
and then MServer derives a random integer y to compute T2 = y.P , k = e P vtkey .x .P, y.P ubu1 and
f (k, Sid ). Then the server sends a user identifier Uid as a Challenge message to MClient . The SS key is the
shared session key and it is substituted from SS key = f ∗ (k).
Flow3: U ser1 → Server : Response{Uid , f (k ∗ , Sid , U ser1 )}
Upon receiving the Challenge{Uid , T2 , f (k, Sid )} from MServer , MClient derives the key k ∗ = e(x.T1 , P vtkey )
from the random integer and private key. Then MClient obtains the hash-value f (k ∗ , Sid ) and compares the
former hash-value with f (k, Sid ). If the two hash-values are matched up, then MClient authorizes MServer
and sends a Response message to MServer . The SS key is the shared session key and it is substituted from
SS key = f ∗ (k ∗ ).
Flow4: MServer → MClient : Connected/N otConnected
After receiving the Response{Uid , f (k ∗ , Sid , U ser1 ) from MClient , MServer obtains the hash-value
f (k, Sid , U ser1 ) and then MServer compares the derived hash-value with f (k ∗ , Sid , U ser1 ). If the hash-values
are matched up, then MServer authorizes and oﬀers the connection service for MClient .
Though the protocol of Kılınç et al. oﬀers the ephemeral key strategy to counteract against major
attacks like replay, key-impersonation, known-key, ephemeral-key, and forward-secrecy, it failed to provide
mutual authenticity and thus does not oﬀer a counteracting strategy reliably for the communication parties.
3.4. AKA scheme of Zhang et al [12]
While user MClient wants service access like voice/data from server MServer , MClient and MServer should
execute the following flows for the service authentication, as represented in Table 5:
Flow1: MClient → MServer : Request{UN ame , U }
MClient generates a random-integer value ra ∈ zq∗ to compute U = ra .P , TU = ra .P ubkey and
UN ame = UN ame ⊕ H(U ||TU ). Then MClient sends a request message UN ame , U to server MServer .
Flow2: MServer →MClient :Challenge{UN ame , ra .P }
rb ∈

After receiving the request message UN ame , U from MClient , MServer generates a random-integer value
to compute V = rb .P , TV = ks .U , SS ks = U.V.P and ω = H(TV ||SS ks || V ||U ) . Then MServer sends

zq∗

a challenge message RE alm , rb , ω to MClient .
Flow3: MClient → MServer : Response{Realm , δ }
After receiving the challenge message RE alm , rb , ω , MClient computes SS ku = U.V.P and evaluates
whether the expression ω = H(TU | |SS ku | |V ||U ) holds or not. If the expression fails to hold, then MClient terminates the sessions. Otherwise, MClient computes the shared-session key SS k = H(UN ame ||SS ku ||TU ||ra ||rb )
and δ = H(RE alm | |TU | |SS ku | |ra | |rb ||H(UN ame ||PW )). Then MClient sends the response message Realm , δ to
MServe .
Flow4: MServer →MClient :Connected/N otConnected
Upon receiving the response message Realm , δ from MClient , MServer computes UN ame = UN ame ⊕
H(U ||TV ) and evaluates whether the expression δ = H(RE alm | |TV | |SS ks | |rb | |ra ||H(UN ame ||PW ′ )). holds or
′

not where PW = VP W Operator[U + 2A01]h(UN ame ||ks ). If it fails to hold, then MServer terminates the
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session. Otherwise, MServer shares the session SS k = H(UN ame ||SS ks || Tv ||ra || rb ) for the purpose of service
authentication.
Table 5. AKA scheme of Zhang et al.

The protocol of Zhang et al. was secure against the attacks of relay, password-guessing, man-in-themiddle, and stolen-verifier, but the protocol failed to oﬀer services like key-impersonation, server-spoofing, and
DoS.
4. Proposed authentication scheme of MASK
This section initially presents the MASK using bilinear pairing systems. Then this section compares the 3GPP
security properties and computational eﬃciencies of four AKA schemes, namely those of Lu et al. [9], Chang
et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al. [12], with the proposed protocol of MASK. Finally, this section
provides a security analysis of the MASK protocol.
4.1. MASK
This section presents the authenticated communication between two powerful systems, namely a multimedia
client ( MClient ) and multimedia server ( MServer ) . This section will propose the MASK with the E-CC. We
present four significant phases, namely system setup, client registration, server-client authentication, and secretkey exchange, for the flow execution of SIP protocol. Table 6 represents the execution flows of the proposed
authentication scheme of MASK.
4.2. 1 Phase of system setup
This phase generates the system parameter for the server system MServer and its communication flows are
described one by one below.
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Table 6. Proposed authentication scheme of MASK.

Flow1: MServer generates a prime integer value q , an elliptic-curve E(GF (q)) over the finite-field
GF (q). P is a point generator of the additive group E(GF (q)) .
Flow2: MServer generates a random-integer value α ∈ Zq∗ as the long-living secret key to compute the
long-living public key s = α.Ps .
Flow3:

MServer chooses a secure hash-value function H(.) and then publishes the server system

parameters q, E (GF (q)) , Ps , H (.) , s .
Phase of client registration
While client MClient wishes to access service like voice/data from server MServer , he/she should enter
the client’s credentials initially into the client system. The execution flows are as follows:
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Flow1: MClient selects the identities, namely UN ame and Pwd without restriction, and then sends the
identities via a secure communication channel. We deploy the secure channel through the Internet and transport
layer security protocols.
Flow2: After receiving the identities, like UN ame and Pwd , MServer computes the secret-key verifier
Sk verf = H(UN ame |α) ⊕ H(UN ame ||Pwd ) and stores the parameters like UN ame and Pwd in the home subscriber
database.
Phases of server-client authentication and secret-key exchange
The flow methodologies are as follows:
Flow1: MClient selects an integer randomly from RC ∈ Zq∗ to compute MU = RC .PC and Sk 1 =
RC .PCS . After the above computation, MClient sends IDMClient , MU to MServer .
Flow2: On receiving the message transmission IDMClient , MU , MServer does the hash computation of
QIDM Client = H(IDMClient ). Then MServer selects an integer randomly from α ∈ Zq∗ to compute, Sk 2 =
(s.MClient ) , CS Auth = H1 (PS , IDMClient , α, Sk 2 ).
and Hf = H1 (IDMClient α, MClient , CS Auth , PS ). Eventually, MServer sends αCS Auth to MClient
Flow3: On receiving the message transmission αCS Auth , MClient verifies whether CS Auth equals
H1 (PS , IDMClient , α, Sk 1 ). We use a strategy like Sk 2 = s.MClient = s. (RC .PC ) .M = (RC .PCS ) .M = Sk 1 to
validate the session keys of the multimedia server-client.
If the session key validation is successful, then MClient does the computation of SkandHf like Sk =
H1 (PS , IDMClient α, MClient , Sk 1 ) and Hf = H1 (IDMClient αMClient , CS Auth , PS ). Eventually, MClient uses
Hf to compute Kverf = RC QIM Client + Hf DIDM Client and sends it to MServer .
Flow 4: On receiving the message transmission, MServer validates whether EV er (QIDM Client , MClient +
Hf .PS ) adheres.
If it adheres successfully, then the SC (server-client) computes the common session key Sk CS =
H1 (PS , IDMClient , α, MClient , Sk 2 ).
The systems, namely MClient and MServer share the common secret key Sk CS to authenticate the
communication flows that are as follows:
Flow1: MClient selects a new secret key Sk N ew to compute σ = H(U N ame | |Sk| |H(UN ame ||PW ′ ||
H(UN ame ||Sk N ew ) and then MClient sends the transfer message UN ame , σ, Pwd to MServer .
Flow2: After receiving the transmission message UN ame , σ, Pwd from MClient , MServer computes
′
H(UN ame ||Sk N ew ) = Pwd ⊕H(Sk||H(UN ame ||Pwd
)) and validates whether the former expression σ = H(U N ame
′

′
| |Sk| |H(UN ame |Pwd
))||H(UN ame ||Sk N ew ) holds or not where Pwd = Pwd ⊕ H(UN ame ||α) . If the expression

does not hold, then MServer terminates the sessions with MClient . Otherwise, MServer modifies Pwd with
′

Sk N ew = H(UN ame |[ERR : md : M begChr = 0x007C, M endChr = 0x0029, nP arams = 1] ⊕ H(UN ame ||Pwd ) .
The above steps are run to share the common session key between the multimedia client M Client and
server M Server securely. The common session key is shared to oﬀer mutual authentication, security privacy,
and preservation consistently.
4.3. 3GPP security features: a comparison
Table 7 illustrates the comparison of 3GPP security properties with the AKA protocols. The proposed
mechanism of MASK is able to achieve inclusive performance compared to the existing schemes of Lu et al.,
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Chang et al., Kılınç et al., and Zhang et al. The proposed protocol of MASK endeavors to:

Table 7. Comparison of 3GPP security properties with the AKA protocols.

Lu et al. [9]

Chang et al. [10]

Kılınç et al. [11]

Zhang et al. [12]

D1

Symmetric

Symmetric

Symmetric

Symmetric

D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7

No
No
No
Partial
No
No

No
Partial
No
No
No
No

Partial
Not reliable
No
No
No
No

Partial
Not reliable
No
No
No
No

MASK
Symmetric,
with the integral
technique of ‘T’
and ‘s’ and D-H
Yes
Yes (reliable)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

D1- Adhere to the type of cryptosystem.
D2- Adhere to counteracting attacks, like replay, redirection, active-corrupted network, known key-secure,
key compromise-impersonate, man-in-the-middle, password-guessing, server-spoofing, stolen-verifier, DoS, and
unknown key-share.
D3- Adhere to share the key mutually between the multimedia server-client to secure the communication.
D4- Adhere to using the predetermination key to reduce the computational overhead.
D5- Adhere to curtailing the signal congestion by the strategy of password predetermination.
D6- Adhere to securing all the components of the multimedia server.
D7- Adhere to mutual authenticity, privacy preservation, perfect forward secrecy, unknown-key share,
known key-share, and reduction of message delivery cost.

5. Computational eﬃciency of AKA schemes
Table 8 compares the computational eﬃciencies of MASK with the other four existing schemes. In the scheme
of Lu et al., the client has to execute 3 scalar-multiplications and 2 hash-operations while the server has to
execute 5 scalar-multiplications, 3 point-additions, and 2 hash-operations. In the scheme of Chang et al., the
client has to execute 7 scalar-multiplications, 2 point-additions, and 4 hash-operations while the server has
to execute 6 scalar-multiplications, 2 point-additions, and 4 hash-operations. In the scheme of Kılınç et al.,
the client has to execute 3 scalar-multiplications, 1 point-addition, 1 bilinear pairing, and 3 hash-operations
while the server has to execute 4 scalar-multiplications, 1 point-subtraction, 1 bilinear pairing, and 3 hashoperations. In the scheme of Zhang et al., the client has to execute 3 scalar-multiplications, 4 hash-operations,
and 1 scalar-exponentiation while the server has to execute 3 scalar-multiplications, 4 hash-operations, and 1
scalar-exponentiation. In MASK, the client has to execute 4 scalar-multiplications, 1 point-addition, and 3 hashoperations, whereas the server has to execute 1 scalar-multiplication, 1 point-addition, and 4 hash-operations.
To have enough strength of security, 160-bit key size is initialized for the four previous AKA protocols and
MASK.
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Table 8. Computational eﬃciencies of AKA protocols

Parameters
Scalar-multiplication
Point-subtraction
Point-addition
Bilinear pairing
Hash-operation
Scalar exponentiation
Key size
C – client S – server

MASK
C S
4 1
0 0
1 1
0 0
3 4
0 0
160 bits

Lu et al. [9]
C
S
3
5
0
0
0
3
0
0
2
2
0
0

Chang
C
7
0
2
0
4
0

et al. [10]
S
6
0
2
0
4
0

Kılınç
C
3
0
1
1
3
0

et al. [11]
S
4
1
0
1
3
0

Zhang
C
3
0
0
0
4
1

et al. [12]
S
3
0
0
0
4
1

6. Security analysis of MASK
This section shows that the proposed protocol of MASK can mutually authenticate the multimedia server-client
using the session key sharing mechanism to avoid SIP flooding attacks. The MASK can also provide perfect
forward secrecy for the multimedia server-client to resist oﬄine password guessing attacks.
Known key-secure: Assume an adversary with a previous session key of ‘SkCS ’ shared as a common
session key for the communication parties, namely Alice and Bob. To deduce the common session key, the
adversary should be able to verify the computed session key Sk1 = Sk2 . Since the verification is hard for the
adversary, we thus assert that the protocol of MASK counteracts the attack of known key.
Key compromise-impersonation: Suppose the client (Alice/Bob) makes the adversaries aware of the
session key. Though the adversaries possess the session key of the client, the adversaries cannot do session-key
verification without the parameter of PCS (client-server prime number). Hence, the protocol of MASK has a
feature of resilience for key compromise-impersonation to counteract against key-impersonation attacks.
Unknown-key share: Since the protocol of MASK does not support the precondition/selection of
session keys, the adversaries cannot determine the actual session keys of the communication parties. Thus, the
protocol of MASK can counteract attacks of unknown-key share.
Redirection attack: Suppose an adversary has a device that is simulated to invoke the functions of the
multimedia server and client. Thus, the adversary can forge the messages of legitimate clients on the networks.
To resolve this issue, the protocol of MASK has discovered a common session for the multimedia communication
parties. Hence, the protocol of MASK can counteract attacks of redirection.
Active attack on corrupted network: Assume a network is completely corrupted, and thus the
adversaries can deduce the session keys of communication parties to impersonate a legal network to connect
with the client. To prevent this, the protocol of MASK has invoked a common session key verification and thus
the scenario of illegitimate networks does not exist. In addition, the session keys of communication parties are
recorded in the database of the subscriber server and thus the server of SCSCF makes usage unavailable for
illegitimate networks.
Mutual authentication: The initial message of the multimedia client contains the challenge number
that is used to be encrypted with the cipher key to be shared later by the multimedia client and SCSCF (serving
call session control function). To validate the shared key, the SCSCF would receive and decrypt the message
into the original text. If it is decrypted successfully into the original text, then it proves that the shared keys
are authenticated by the multimedia client and SCSCF. Even if any attackers/intruders steal the shared key
of the multimedia client or SCSCF, the multimedia client/SCSCF can deduce/verify in the second round-trip
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of message transmission. This is owing to the parameter of ‘s’ in the Diﬃe–Hellman problem to compute the
session key from the one-way hash function. Most importantly, the parameter of P s is already shared with the
multimedia server-client to show the authenticated session key reliability.
Perfect forward secrecy: Even though the cipher key and challenging number are known to the
adversary, they cannot compute the session key for the multimedia server-client. This is owing to the parameters
of R c and R s that are to be determined from the random number belonging to Zq∗ . To determine the shared
session key of the multimedia server-client, the attackers should have to guess the correct one-way hash function.
This is usually very hard. Thus, the protocol of MASK adheres to the property of perfect forward secrecy.
Password-guessing (online) attack: If any adversary wants to presume the secret key of a legitimate
user for the logon server, he/she must contrive a rational secret key Ps , but the adversary cannot formulate a
valid secret key without the knowledge of Hf = H1 (IDMClient αMClient , CS Auth , PS ) and thus the protocol of
MASK can withstand attacks of password guessing (online).
Stolen-verifier attack: Assume that the client credential is breached and thus the adversary may use
the breaching information to steal the session keys of the communication parties. Though the adversary has
the breaching information of the client, the adversary cannot invoke the parameter CS Auth that is used to be
computed while the session keys are being shared between the communication parties. Thus, we assert that the
protocol of MASK can withstand attacks of stolen verifiers.
Man-in-the-middle attack: Assuming that an adversary wants to carry out the attack of man-in-themiddle, he/she must secretly listen the logon request/response message, message communication, and session
key sharing between the communication parties, but the adversary cannot invoke the parameters, namely
Sk , Sk1 , Sk2 , PS , andα . Thus, we assert that the MASK protocol can withstand attacks of man-in-the-middle.
Server-spoofing attack: Assume a mischievous server MServer1 wants to betray MClient in lieu of
MServer and the objective of server mischief is to invoke the session key of MServer , although the protocol of
MASK cannot render the session key without the successful verification. Thus, we assert that the protocol of
MASK can withstand attacks of server-spoofing.
Replay attack: In the protocol of MASK, the random numbers ra andrb are selected randomly to
let the adversaries out of the systems. Since the random values are diﬀerent for every authentication, the
adversary cannot counterfeit the procedural steps of authentication. Besides, the oﬀ-sync feature will earn the
authentication failure for the illegitimate user and thus the protocol of MASK withstands attacks of replay.
Denial of service attack: Since a mischievous client launches the attack through the SCSCF, the
authentication protocol of MASK has a strategy of detection in the HSS as Kverf . As the protocol of MASK
generates its common session key using its knowledgeable parameters, like ra rb RCandPC , thus the MASK
protocol can verify its generated session key through the HSS to withstand attacks of DoS.
Providing privacy for multimedia users: The entities of multimedia, namely the client and server,
use two-party key-transfer authentication protocol (K-TAP)/two-party key-agreement authentication protocol
(K-AAP) [37] to plot the route procedure between the multimedia entities. For the KA protocol of the IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), the private identity of the multimedia client is removed from the original SIP
(session initiation protocol) transmission. The message of SIP is routed through the call session control function
(CSCF) using the domain of IMS to unveil the public identity of the multimedia client. Thus, we assert that
the protocol of MASK provides privacy preservation for multimedia server-client systems.
Reducing message delivery cost: Media streaming is protected using the key sharing protocol with
reasonable usage of latency, although the solution of MIKEY [11] uses a strategy of session description protocol
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(SDP) to minimize the additional message delivery cost. To mitigate the message delivery cost, the server-client
systems employ the strategy of twofold verification rather than hash verification. The mitigation of message
delivery cost also oﬀers the minimum signal congestion for the multimedia server-client system.
Mutual authentication: This strategy is commonly employed to mitigate the spam over IP-telephony
(SPIT) [12]. In addition, it ensures the validity of the multimedia server-client or service provider of the
multimedia domain network. The protocol of MASK uses the parameters Kverf andEV er to oﬀer twofold
verification strategy to authenticate the sessions of server-client systems. We thus assert that the protocol of
MASK holds the property of AKA protocol.
The next section will demonstrate the multimedia server-client setup for the AKA schemes of Lu et al.,
Chang et al., Kılınç et al., and Zhang et al. and MASK. Then we will analyze metrics like call setup time
and flooding (SIP) attack detection rate through a real-time multimedia system to show the importance of the
MASK protocol.

7. Results and discussion
The multimedia server-client is installed under three Linux operating systems (OSs). The OS oﬀers a Pentium
i5-4440 processor and it is capable of 3.10 GHz clock speed, 6.0 MB cache, and DDR3-1333/1600 memory type.
The cryptographic library of MIRACL (http://www.shamus.ie/index.php) is installed and configured in Linux
OS. It is enabled in the environment of the multimedia server-client to provide functions like multiprecision
rational arithmetic integers.
To examine the voice service realistically, we deploy five multimedia servers of OpenIMSCore
(http://www.openim-score.org/) in Linux PCs (that is, Linux Mint) with unique IP addresses and domain
names. The IP address and domain name of server1 are {192.68.77.30,test1.test}, whereas those of server2 are
{192.168.77.31,test2.test}, those of server3 are {192.168.77.32,test3.test}, those of server4 are {192.168.77.33,
test4.test}, and those of server5 are {192.168.77.34,test5.test}. To play the voice service physically between
the laptops/desktops, we install ten multimedia clients of UCTIMS (http://uctimsclient.berlios.de/) in Linux
PCs (that is, Linux Mint) to establish the service of voice calls through the multimedia server to examine the
metrics of call setup time and flooding (SIP) attack detection rate.
The physical multimedia server-client environment is depicted in Figure 1. The servers of multimedia are
composed of three diﬀerent CSCFs, namely proxy, serving, and interrogating, to process the signaling packets
of SIP and one user database server, namely the home subscriber server (HSS). The AKA protocol of MASK
is integrated with M Server1 , whereas the protocols of Lu et al., Chang et al., Kılınç et al., and Zhang et al.
are integrated with M Server2 , M Server3 , M Server4 , and M Server5 to cross-examine the metrics of call setup
time, flooding (SIP) attack detection rate, and signal congestion rate. The voice call is established between the
multimedia server-client through the Internet service of either WiFi or WLAN to examine the former metrics.
The multimedia servers of M server1 , M server2 , M Server3 , M Server4 , and M Server5 are run in parallel
for 4 h. The initial 2 h are used to probe the call setup time (voice service) and the remaining 2 h are used
to examine the flooding attack detection rate. To inspect the flooding detection rate genuinely, we install
and configure the flooding tools of SIP and the resources of codes are taken from http://www.backtracklinux.org/wiki/index.php/Pentesting VOIP. The network traﬃc tool of ntop (www.ntop.org/) is installed and
configured with the multimedia server-client systems to analyze the metrics logically. The voice codec of G.723
is configured with the multimedia client for better exchange of transmission rate. The clients are configured
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physically with the network of IEEE 802.11a. The SIP flooding attacks like invite, reinvite, and rtp (real-time
transport protocol) are used to test the true detection rate over the false detection rate.
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Figure 1. Multimedia server-client environment.

The forthcoming sections will demonstrate the metrics such as call setup time, flooding (SIP) detection
rate, and signal congestion rate in the environment of the multimedia server-client.
Figure 2 illustrates call setup time. The multimedia server is run in five Linux platforms through which
the multimedia clients, namely client 1-2, client 3-4, client 5-6, client 7-8, and client 9-10, are established with
voice call service to probe the call response time every 40 min. Since the proposed MASK protocol uses twofold
verification, namely Kverf andEV er , to establish the service, Server1-Client1-2 with MASK shows the minimum
response time compared to Server2-Client3-4 with Lu et al., Server3-Client5-6 with Chang et al., Server4Client7-8 with Kılınç et al., and Server5-Client9-10 with Zhang et al. Most importantly, Server1-Client1-2
with MASK regularly initiates the voice call at around 0.231 s and 0.261 s, whereas Server2-Client3-4 with Lu
et al. establishes the voice call at around 0.388 s, Server3-Client5-6 with Chang et al. establishes the voice
call at around 0.452 s, Server4-Client7-8 with Kılınç et al. establishes the voice call at around 0.491 s, and
Server5-Client9-10 with Zhang et al. establishes the voice call at around 0.371 s.
Figure 3 illustrates the flooding (SIP) attack detection rate. The adversary has the breaching information
of the client system, but he/she cannot invoke the parameter CS Auth to compute the session keys. So as to examine the SIP flooding attack realistically, the flooding tools of invite, reinvite, and bye (http://www.backtracklinux.org/wiki/index.php/Pentesting VOIP) are installed and configured with the multimedia client system.
When we inspected the ‘SIP Traﬃc’ after the attacks being triggered, it was shown that Server1-Client1-2 with
MASK achieves the acceptable true detection rate (close to 93.5%) when its false positive rate is even set to
3%, whereas the other security mechanisms like Server2-Client3-4 with Lu et al., Server3-Client5-6 with Chang
et al., Server4-Client7-8 with Kılınç et al., and Server5-Client9-10 with Zhang et al. achieve much lower true
detection rates (close to 43.1%, 42.1%, 44.1%, and 45.1%) when their false positive rate is even set to 1.5%.
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Figure 2. Call setup time.
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The proposed mechanism of MASK has retracted the on-time computation of the authentication key
by the strategic technique of key predetermination (‘T’). The parameter of the server private key (‘s’) is used
to curtail the pairing computation of the multimedia server-client. The former mechanism helps to ease the
computational time of the server-client authentication and the latter mechanism is employed to minimize the
traﬃc congestion of the multimedia server-client. Figure 4 illustrates that Server1-Client1-2 with MASK has
much less signal congestion in comparison with the existing schemes, namely Server2-Client3-4 with Lu et al.,
Server3-Client5-6 with Chang et al., Server4-Client7-8 with Kılınç et al., and Server5-Client9-10 with Zhang et
al. The results for signal congestion were validated through the traﬃc analyzer tool of ntop.
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Figure 4. Signal congestion rate.
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When we analyzed the real-time multimedia server-client systems, it was verified that the proposed
mechanism of MASK can incur better session key security, and thereby the voice call establishment of the serverclient system abides by all the security-associated mechanisms of 3GPP. Furthermore, the MASK strategy is
well suited for the protection of the media system against SIP flooding attacks.
8. Conclusion
Since the existing protocols like those of Lu et al. [9], Chang et al. [10], Kılınç et al. [11], and Zhang et al.
[12] have not had salient 3GPP features of reasonable computational overhead, mutual authenticity, and signal
congestion, we have thus proposed the mechanism of MASK for real-time multimedia server-client systems.
The proposed authentication mechanism of MASK can mitigate the computational overhead comparatively
better than the existing protocols. Besides, the proposed mechanism of MASK satisfies all security features of
the 3GPP AKA protocol, such as mutual authentication, forward secrecy, privacy, known-key security, and so
on. Importantly, the MASK exploits the idea of a symmetric key cryptosystem to achieve the feature of key
preservation in 4G networks.
Moreover, it skillfully shares the session key to ease the computational overhead of the multimedia
server-client systems. The technique of twofold verification is used to reduce the message delivery cost. The
experimental results of the multimedia server-client system show that the proposed mechanism of MASK can
mitigate call setup time, flooding attack detection rate, and signal congestion rate relatively better than the
methods of Lu et al., Chang et al., Kılınç et al., and Zhang et al. Above all, the mechanism of MASK meets
the 3GPP specifications for end-to-end security improvement.
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